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ABSTRACT
On January 18, 2011, President Obama signed Executive
Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review, which instructs federal regulators to do the fol-
lowing: coordinate their agencies activities to simplify and
harmonize rules that may be overlapping, inconsistent, or
redundant; determine whether the present and future
benefits of a proposed regulation justify its potential costs
(including taking into account both quantitative and
qualitative factors); increase participation of industry,
experts, and the public (“stakeholders”) in the formal
rule-making process; encourage the use of warnings,
default rules, disclosure requirements, and provisions of
information to the public as an alternative to traditional
“command-and-control” rule-making restricting con-
sumer choice; and mandate a government-wide review of
all existing administrative rules to remove outdated regu-
lations. Executive Order 13563 includes a qualitative
“values” provision to be considered in the required cost–
benefit analysis, which can potentially counteract the
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alleged regulatory reform rationale of President Obama.
Furthermore, in Executive Order 13563, President
Obama established a deadline of May 18, 2011, for all
executive branch agencies to submit their plans to
streamline their rulemaking operations and repeal those
“overlapping, inconsistent, or redundant” rules. These two
issues, along with complementary regulatory review pro-
posals being discussed in the U.S. Congress, are evalu-
ated in this essay.
After two years of demonizing the profiteers of Americanbig business in the media, President Obama recentlypolitically pivoted to began his reelection bid by offering
American big business a “peace offering”—what he refers to as a
“21st century regulatory system”—that he hopes will revive the
nation’s economy from its lackluster annual gross domestic
product growth rates and consistently high, “European-level”
unemployment rate (p. 186). On January 18, 2011, he signed
Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review,1 which instructs federal regulators to do the following:
coordinate their agencies activities to simplify and harmonize
rules that may be overlapping, inconsistent, or redundant; deter-
mine whether the present and future benefits of a proposed
regulation justify its potential costs (including taking into account
both quantitative and qualitative factors); increase participation of
industry, experts, and the public (“stakeholders”) in the formal
rule-making process; encourage the use of warnings, default
rules, disclosure requirements, and provisions of information to
the public as an alternative to traditional “command-and-control”
rule-making restricting consumer choice; and mandate a
government-wide review of all existing administrative rules to
remove outdated regulations.
In his editorial2 in the Wall Street Journal, also published on
January 18, 2011, President Obama explained the rationale
behind Executive Order 13563:
This order requires that federal agencies ensure that regula-
tions protect our safety, health and environment while pro-
moting economic growth. It’s a review that will help bring
order to regulations that have become a patchwork of over-
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lapping rules, the result of tinkering by administrations and
legislators of both parties and the influence of special inter-
ests in Washington over decades.
Executive Order 13563 is explicitly designed to affirm and
supplement Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and
Review) established in 1993 under the Clinton administration.
However, Executive Order 13563 includes a qualitative “values”
provision to be considered in the required cost–benefit analysis,
which can potentially counteract the alleged regulatory reform
rationale of President Obama. Furthermore, in Executive Order
13563, President Obama established a deadline of May 18, 2011
(“within 120 days of the date of this order”) for all executive
branch agencies to submit their plans to streamline their rule-
making operations and repeal those “overlapping, inconsistent, or
redundant” rules (although such agencies have been required to
prepare such plans since the establishment of Executive Order
12886). These two issues, along with complementary public policy
proposals being discussed in the U.S. Congress (“Regulations
from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny [REINS] Act”), will be
subsequently addressed in this article.
A TROUBLESOME REGULATORY REVIEW PROVISION
While Section 1 of Executive Order 13563 specifically reiterates
five principles involving consideration of benefits, costs, and
burdens from Executive Order 12886, Section 1 also asks federal
agencies “to use the best available techniques to quantify [empha-
sis added] anticipated present and future compliance costs
[including those that might result from technological innovation
or anticipated behavioral changes] as accurately as possible.”
What is troubling, however, is the expansion of intangible impacts
and potential harms weighted in the mandated cost–benefit analy-
ses of this executive order. Under Section 1, federal agencies may
discuss certain values that “are difficult or impossible to quan-
tify.” These values, to be considered “where appropriate and
permitted by law,” include “equity, human dignity, fairness, and
distributive impacts.”
While in Executive Order 12886, the Clinton administration
had discussed the need to consider such values as “distributive
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justice” and “equity” in cost–benefit analyses of federal admin-
istrative rules, the Obama administration has further enhanced
this “regulatory philosophy” by incorporating the new values of
“human dignity” and “fairness,” which are, in essence, now an
express element to be factored into agency regulatory cost–
benefit analyses. Some critics believe that these additional
intangible values factored into a cost–benefit analysis threaten
to “balance” against a particularly heavy assessment of tangible
costs. Contrarily, according to regulatory economist Robert
Hahn3:
[U]nder certain plausible conditions, it makes sense for the
government to produce less or regulate less than it other-
wise would based on a standard benefit-cost model
. . . . For example, including costs associated with income
redistribution, raising funds, monitoring and enforcement,
or partial compliance makes many regulatory interventions
look less attractive. Yet, at least some of these factors are
frequently not systematically considered in analyzing the
impact of law and regulation, even when they are poten-
tially important.
Developing acceptable working definitions of “human dignity”
and “fairness” and applying them to assess the risks that the
proposed regulation would abate, as well as the benefits the
proposed regulation would generate, could require executive
branch technocrats to exercise the wisdom of King Solomon in
accurately quantifying these values. Values of “equity, human
dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts” are important factors
to be debated in the public policy arena—and are, in fact, the
grist of such discussion. If indeed these values “are difficult or
impossible to quantify,” a strong policy argument can be made
that the appropriate institution for such intangible values to be
discussed and debated is in the U.S. Congress—and not the
executive branch—where enabling legislation addressing busi-
ness regulatory policy is formulated (and qualitative regulatory
“boundaries” are defined and articulated) by elected representa-
tives to guide (and “bound”) the administrative rule-making
processes and executive branch enforcement activities. This
approach to regulatory policy development properly restricts the
impulse of the executive branch to “legislate by regulation.”
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REGULATORY REVIEW DEADLINE RESULTS
On May 18, 2011, all federal executive branch agencies (although
not independent agencies of the federal government) were
required to submit plans that retrospectively review their signifi-
cant administrative rules to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). On
May 26, 2011, the White House announced that 30 federal execu-
tive branch agencies had reported on their plans to repeal or
revise administrative rules to reduce business compliance costs.4
As of June 30, 2011, the OIRA reports on its web site (Regin-
fo.Gov) that there are presently 134 pending regulatory actions
under review, with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(24) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (24)
leading this regulatory review effort among executive branch agen-
cies. In a recent presentation5 at the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, Cass Sunstein, Director of OIRA, proclaimed that the
proposed regulatory changes would have a “big impact” on the
rail, airline, and medical device industries, as well as health-care
facilities and physicians. In fact, Sunstein reported that possible
regulatory reforms identified by the U.S. EPA, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, and the U.S. Department of Labor com-
bined will generate over $1 billion in savings.
Those anticipated federal regulatory cost savings will be wel-
comed by the American business community, as business regu-
latory costs in 2008 were recently estimated at $1.75 trillion
annually in a recent U.S. Small Business Administration study
conducted by Lafayette College economists Nicole V. Crain and W.
Mark Crain of Lafayette College.6 Yet, as James Gattuso, senior
research fellow in regulatory policy at the Heritage Foundation,
argued in his recent testimony before Congress7:
Many of the steps announced last week [by Cass Sunstein,
Director of OIRA] are the low-hanging fruit of regulatory
excesses which should have been plucked long ago.
Many actions are merely suggestions for a change at a later
date. For instance, only two rule changes have been finalized
by the EPA.
Moreover, these proposed regulatory rollbacks are far
exceeded by new regulations which have been or will be
promulgated.8
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Moreover, the Obama initiative was hardly “government
wide.” It excluded independent agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. In so doing, the President excluded from scrutiny
many of the largest producers of red tape.
James Gattuso’s observation regarding agencies has particular
salience. In previous administrations, independent agencies have
always followed the lead of the OIRA. In this particular case,
however, only the National Labor Relations Board voluntarily sub-
mitted a one-page document to the OIRA in response to President
Obama’s executive order.9
According to the Crane and Crane study, regulatory costs in
2008 that impact on U.S. businesses translate to $8,086 per
employee, with small businesses (fewer than 20 employees)
bearing an annual regulatory cost in 2008 of $10,585 per
employee, or 42 percent greater than medium-sized firms (defined
as 20 to 499 employees) and 36 percent higher than regulatory
costs confronted by large firms (defined as 500 employees or
above). In a recent study conducted by John W. Dawson of
Appalachia State University and John J. Seater of North Carolina
University, the two economists used the page count of the Code of
Federal Regulations as a proxy for the extent of regulation and
estimated that the 2008 GDP would be $11.3 trillion higher if not
for the opportunity costs imposed by federal regulations.10 The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce identifies the real problem behind
this regulatory excess by focusing in on the increasing number of
“economically significant regulations,” that is, those costing busi-
nesses, consumers, and the economy more than $100 million.11
According to the analysis of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
during the five-year period of 2006–2010, the number of such
economically significant regulations increased by 61 percent, from
139 (2006) to 224 (2010). Over the last two years of the Obama
administration (2009–2010), the number of economically signifi-
cant regulations increased by 24 percent, from 180 in 2008 to a
record 224 in 2010.
The benefits associated with regulations, while often a chal-
lenge to quantify, are also evaluated by the OMB. The OMB has
estimated that the annual benefits of major federal regulations
from October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2009, for which agencies
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estimated and monetized both benefits and costs, are in the
aggregate between $128 billion and $616 billion, while the esti-
mated annual costs are in the aggregate between $43 billion and
$55 billion.12 Some administrative rules are estimated to produce
far higher net benefits than others. Moreover, there is substantial
variation across agencies in the total net benefits produced by
administrative rules.
REINING IN REGULATION?
While the Obama administration’s efforts at regulatory review are
laudable, in most instances, the administrative process to elimi-
nate or better harmonize such rules involves a time frame that
could take up to a year to complete, thus having little near-term
affect on U.S. job creation and industry competitiveness.13 In
fiscal year (FY) 2010, based on data provided by the Government
Accountability Office, the Heritage Foundation calculated that the
annual costs of an unprecedented 43 major regulations would
impose $28 billion annually on American businesses and con-
sumers.14 Moreover, the Federal Register, where administrative
rules governing interstate business behavior are published, is now
at an all-time record of 81,000 pages.15 If one wants serious
regulatory reform, he or she needs to address this issue where it
begins—in the U.S. Congress.
“Regulations,” or administrative rules, are the end result of
public policy expressed in legal statutes voted upon by the legis-
lature. The executive branch is responsible for developing admin-
istrative rules in their agency enforcement of the statute. Thus,
the reason for a record 224 economically significant regulations in
FY2010 is because the U.S. Congress was actively passing legis-
lation (and the president signing them into law). Better under-
standing the economic impact, that is, the costs and benefits, of
legislation having regulatory effects on business can have a sig-
nificant influence on what public policy is passed, and the ulti-
mate form of the subsequent administrative rules. The Heritage
Foundation has wisely recommended that Congress establish its
own Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis (CORA)—a legis-
lative version of the executive branch’s OMB (and OIRA)—so as it
may independently review existing and proposed administrative
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rules.16 However, CORA could be of great assistance to legislators
in providing realistic cost–benefit analysis of proposed statutes
before they are voted on to become law, for example, in the case
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
In the 112th Congress, both the U.S. House of Representatives
(HR. 10) and the U.S. Senate (S. 299) are considering the “Regu-
lations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act.” The
REINS Act requires both houses of Congress to affirmatively
approve, and the president to sign, any “economically significant
regulation,” that is, administrative rule with a projected impact to
the U.S. economy exceeding $100 million, before it becomes law.
The REINS Act, although proposed with good intentions, is not, in
its present formulation, a workable solution to the regulatory
excess problem. In an interview in Free Enterprise, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce magazine, former OIRA Director (under
President George W. Bush) John Graham argued that17
Something like the REINS Act is more feasible if you target it
to a small number of rules every year where members of
Congress would realistically have the time and information
available to focus on those rules enough where they could
prepare and understand what they are looking at. We already
have a problem in Congress in which members vote on a
whole bunch of pieces of legislative action when they don’t
necessarily really know what is in the legislative action. Layer
on top of that the idea that members of Congress are going
to vote on all these hundreds of regulations, and it’s just not
realistic.
Moreover, under authority granted to the Congress under the
Congressional Review Act of 1996, major administrative rules take
effect unless Congress passes and the president signs a joint
resolution disapproving them. In the ensuing 15 years, this con-
gressional authority has been successfully exercised only once (an
Office of Safety and Health Administration [OSHA] regulation
addressing ergonomics in the workplace). Furthermore, this
OSHA regulation was disapproved in June 2001, when there were
both a Republican president and Republican-controlled Congress,
and was the only rule that was disapproved (among tens of
thousands implemented) during a six-year period of Republican
control of both the executive and legislative branches. For the
REINS Act to be effective, and based on experience with the
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Congressional Review Act of 1996, its authority should be limited
by specific qualifying criteria, including “super” economically sig-
nificant regulations—for example, those administrative rules
projected to exceed $250 million in projected economic impact—
and/or those regulations that economically impact industries that
are critical to U.S. global competitiveness, for example, biotech-
nology and pharmaceuticals, defense-related, health care, infor-
mation technology, and nanotechnology. By focusing on a very
limited number of such high-impact administrative rules, Con-
gress can realistically allocate its members’ time on those admin-
istrative rules having maximum economic impact on industries
critical to the nation’s economic well-being. These proposed regu-
latory reform recommendations could go a long way to creating
that “21st Century Federal Regulatory System” strived for by the
Obama administration.
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